Criminal Law -- Enforcement of Plea Bargaining Agreements by Vanore, Richard L.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 51 | Number 3 Article 13
2-1-1973
Criminal Law -- Enforcement of Plea Bargaining
Agreements
Richard L. Vanore
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard L. Vanore, Criminal Law -- Enforcement of Plea Bargaining Agreements, 51 N.C. L. Rev. 602 (1973).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol51/iss3/13
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Law-Enforcement of Plea Bargaining Agreements
The term "plea bargaining" suggests a give-and-take process
whereby a plea is bargained for between the accused and the prosecuting
attorney, both making concessions. Generally the accused will plead
guilty as charged or guilty to a lesser included offense in return for a
promise by the prosecution to make sentence concessions, to ignore
recidivism, or to drop other pending charges.'
The typical plea bargaining agreement arises after a plea of not
guilty. After negotiations with the prosecutor, the defendant withdraws
his previously entered plea of not guilty and enters a guilty plea pursuant
to a plea bargaining agreement. Entry of the guilty plea has fulfilled the
defendant's part of the bargain. Does the prosecuting attorney have to
perform as agreed? Is anyone other than the promisor-the prosecuting
attorney or the judge who makes the promise on behalf of the
state-bound by the agreement? In Santobello v. New York,2 the
United States Supreme Court held that a promise made by an assistant
district attorney must be honored if it was a material inducement to the
petitioner's guilty plea. In ordering enforcement of the promise, the
Court bound a prosecutor who neither participated in nor had knowl-
edge of the plea bargaining agreement. The opinion did not order any
specific relief. Instead, a choice of alternative remedies-withdrawal of
the guilty plea or specific performance of the promise-was left for state
court determination.'
In 1969 Santobello was indicted in New York for two first degree
gambling offenses. 4 After negotiations with the assistant district attor-
ney, Santobello withdrew a not-guilty plea and pleaded guilty to the
lesser included offense of possession of gambling records in the second
degree. The assistant district attorney agreed to make no recommenda-
tion as to the sentence. Before sentencing and after obtaining new de-
fense counsel, Santobello moved to withdraw the guilty plea on grounds
of newly discovered evidence.5 The motion was subsequently denied but
'Comment, Constitutional Law-Plea Bargaining-New Jersey Statute Allowing A Defen-
dant to Avoid the Death Penalty by Pleading Non Vult or Nola Contendere Held Valid, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 612, 617-618 (1969).
292 S. Ct. 495 (1971).
1Id. at 499.
'The offenses charged were promoting gambling in the first degree and possession of gambling
records in the first degree. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 225.10, .20 (McKinney 1967).
'Upon discovery of the new evidence-possible illegal search-the petitioner moved to with-
draw the guilty plea, to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the "illegal search," and to
inspect the grand jury minutes. All three motions were denied by the trial court. 92 S. Ct. at 497.
[Vol. 51
PLEA BARGAINING
only after a series of delays. At length Santobello was sentenced, but
not before a new prosecuting attorney had been appointed. The new
prosecutor presented petitioner's criminal record to the court and rec-
ommended the maximum sentence of one year. Defense counsel imme-
diately objected that during plea negotiations the assistant district attor-
ney had agreed not to make any sentence recommendations to the trial
judge, but the presiding trial judge overruled defense counsel's objec-
tions, stating that he was "not at all influenced by what the District
Attorney says" and that his imposition of the maximum sentence was
entirely justified and mandated by evidence from other sources.' The
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed.7
On certiorari the Supreme Court held that where a promise is "part
of the inducement or consideration" 8 for the guilty plea, fulfillment of
the promise is necessary. The burden of informing all those concerned
is on the prosecuting official making the promise; anyone who later
takes up the prosecution is bound by the agreement?
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Burger emphasized the
importance of maintaining a functional plea bargaining system. The
Court spoke of plea negotiations as "not only an essential part of the
process but a highly desirable part for many reasons."' 10 Underlying the
decision, however, are due process considerations: the circumstances
surrounding plea negotiations "presuppose fairness in securing agree-
ment between an accused and a prosecutor,"" and in order that fairness
may be achieved and the integrity of the system preserved, plea negotia-
tions "must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is
reasonably due. .. .*"I The Court carefully pointed out that although
a promise must be a material inducement to the entry of the plea, the
materiality of the breach is not a proper subject of inquiry. 3 Thus, the
fact that the trial judge would have imposed the maximum sentence of
one year regardless of the sentencing recommendation made by the
prosecutor was deemed to be of no relevance to the enforceability of the
promise. 4 The inquiry is a subjective one-did the accused plead guilty
11d. at 497-98.
'Santobello v. New York, 35 App. Div. 2d 1084, 316 N.Y.S.2d 194 (mem.).
'92 S. Ct. at 499.
'Id.
JId. at 498 (emphasis added).
"Id. (emphasis added).
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in reliance on the prosecution's promise? The court was brief in its
treatment of the issue of who is bound by the promise of a prosecuting
official: 5 if the accused is to be assured of "safeguards," the sovereign
must be found; otherwise the Court's mandate would be rendered mean-
ingless.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas was even more inclined
to justify enforcement of the agreement on constitutional grounds. After
pointing out the close scrutiny given by the Court in past cases concern-
ing guilty pleas, Justice Douglas concluded that enforcement of plea
bargains should be a "constitutional rule," with the remedy, whether it
be withdrawal of the plea or specific performance of the promise, left
to state court determination in accordance with due process. 6 He indi-
cated that the petitioner's preference as to the remedy applicable in a
given case should be given due weight. Justice Marshall, with whom
Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart joined, concurred in part and dis-
sented in part. 7
It has been estimated that ninety to ninety-five percent of all crimi-
nal convictions and seventy to eighty-five percent of felony convictions
are obtained by guilty pleas. 8 There can be little doubt that plea bar-
gains have been instrumental in a majority of these guilty pleas. Many
policy reasons support the use of plea bargains, including relief for the
already overburdened courts and reduction of the expenses involved in
trials and in the individualized administration of justice. 9 On the other
hand, a number of Supreme Court decisions, as Justice Douglas indi-
cated in Santobello,21 have established that a guilty plea involves the
151d.
"Id. at 501. The majority opinion made no specific reference to a "constitutional rule."
"Justice Marshall expressed the opinion that the petitioner's preference of relief should be
given priority because the basis of the waiver of substantial constitutional rights had been removed
when the prosecutor reneged on the promise. Id. at 501-02.
18D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL
3 & n.l (1966).
t9Id. at 4; see Note, The Role of Plea Negotiations In Modern Criminal Law, 46 CHi.-KENT
L. REV. 116 (1969). For a brief discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of plea negotiations
see Note, Plea Bargaining-Justice Off the Record, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 430, 433 (1970). For an in-
depth discussion see Alshuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50
(1968). Alshuler sees the bargaining prosecutor as an administrator, advocate, judge, and legislator.
292 S. Ct. at 500. Justice Douglas cites the following cases: In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(right to be convicted of proof beyond all reasonable doubt); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to present defense
witnesses); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront one's accusers); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (right to remain silent).
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waiver of a number of fundamental constitutional rights, such as the
right to a jury trial and the right to confront one's accusers. For this
reason, a line of decisions has established requirements for the accept-
ance and withdrawal of guilty pleas for both state and federal courts.
Beginning in 1927 with the landmark case of Kercheval v. United
States,'2 1 the Court held that federal courts could not accept guilty pleas
unless the pleas were voluntarily made upon proper advice and with full
understanding of the consequences. A guilty plea should be vacated if
unfairly obtained or if entered through ignorance, fear, or inadvert-
ence.12 Following Kercheval, the Court, in cases involving federal prose-
cutions, established that due process is offended where prosecutorial
misrepresentations lead to the guilty plea 3 and that promises or threats
could deprive a guilty plea of its voluntariness. 4 In 1970 the Supreme
Court, in Brady v. United States, recognized the legitimacy of plea
bargains by holding that the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit judges
and prosecutors from accepting guilty pleas to lesser included offenses
or reducing charges in return for a guilty plea.u
In 1969 the Supreme Court held in Boykin v. Alabama2 1 that it was
error for the state trial judge not to disclose on the record whether the
defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his guilty plea. The
language of the opinion indicated that since a guilty plea was a waiver
of fundamental constitutonal rights, federal due process standards must
come into play. 7 The impact of Boykin appears at least to provide
better safeguards and standards for the acceptance of guilty pleas. This
constitutional reading of Boykin accords with the general trend during
the last decade toward "enlargement of the constitutionally protected
rights of a defendant.
'28
One of the safeguards governing acceptance of guilty pleas has been
judicial circumscription of the freedom of the prosecuting officials and
judges to ignore plea bargaining agreements. The judicial approach,
however, has not been uniform. The nature of the promise given by the
21274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
221d. at 224.
"Walter v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
I'Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
-397 U.S. 742, 751-55 (1970).
26395 U.S. 238 (1969).
2Id. at 243.
"Comment, The Guilty Plea and Bargaining, 17 LOYOLA L. REV. 703, 713 (1971); accord,
Note, Criminal Procedure-Requirements for Acceptance of Guilty Pleas, 48 N.C.L. REv. 352
(1970).
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prosecution has in the past made a difference. Promises of immunity to
prosecution have generally received a treatment different from promises
to reduce sentences or to substitute a lesser included offense for that
initially charged. Possibly this different treatment is due to the Whiskey
Cases2 in which promises of complete immunity and of leniency were
made to certain defendants and accomplices in return for testimony
implicating their co-defendants. While recognizing that such promises
were generally fulfilled, the Court held that they were no defense to
subsequent indictment and that they constituted, at most, only an "equi-
table claim" to immunity.3 A number of lower federal and state courts
have followed the language of the Whiskey Cases,31 basing the denial
of enforcement on the lack of authority on the part of the prosecutor
to grant such immunity.
A substantial number of promise-of-immunity cases have refused
to follow the Whiskey Cases.3 For example, in United States v.
Paiva,1 the defendant agreed to plead guilty to four specified felonies
in return for the assistant district attorney's agreement to drop other
charges. In a well-reasoned opinion, the district court held in Paiva that
later indictments in violation of the plea bargaining agreement must be
dismissed. Although the Paiva court clearly did not consider the
Whiskey Cases to be sound judicial authority, it distinguished them on
the grounds that they involved promises of leniency made to co-
defendants and accomplices.34 In the recent case of United States V.
Carter," the Fourth Circuit, relying heavily on Paiva, indicated that it
would not only enforce an immunity-of-prosecution promise made by
the U.S. assistant district attorney for the District of Columbia but also
bind the U.S. District Attorney's Office in Virginia to the same promise.
Where prosecutorial promises have not involved immunity of pros-
-99 U.S. 594 (1878).
2 2The only relief available to the accused was hope of an executive pardon. Id. at 595-96.
"1Hunter v. United States, 405 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1969); Huerta v. United States, 322 F.2d
1 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964); District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942); People v. Groves, 63 Cal. App. 709, 219 P. 1033
(1923); State v. Crow, 367 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. 1963); Tullis v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 87, 52 S.W. 83
(1899).
32Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 281, 288 (1972) suggests that the deciding factor has been whether the
lower court approved the agreement in the first instance.
13294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969).
111d. at 744-46. The court relied heavily on Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), to conclude that the separation of powers doctrine was no bar to enforcement because
of the general powers of the court to supervise the administration of criminal justice.
2454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972); see note 41 infra.
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ecution, federal courts have been more willing to enforce the plea bar-
gaining agreements. For example, in Dillon v. United States" the as-
sistant district attorney promised that if he were asked by the court to
make a sentencing recommendation, he would recommend a sentence
of ten years. Relying on this promise, the petitioner pleaded guilty. It
appeared from the record that the sentencing judge rarely asked for the
prosecution's recommendation at sentencing. The Ninth Circuit held
that the prosecutor's promise was illusory if he knew that the judge was
unlikely to request a sentence recommendation and that the deception
violated due process if the illusory promise had acted as an inducement
to the petitioner's plea of guilty.
37
There are a substantial number of state decisions retreating from
the Whiskey Cases. In Austin v. State'38 the Wisconsin court expressly
refused to follow the line of decisions holding promises of immunity
unenforceable. The court did not base the enforcement merely on the
usual grounds of public policy and good faith.3 9 The Austin court said,
"We consider that the facts constituting good public policy require the
application of the doctrine of due process . . . ."I' State courts have
frequently stated that a guilty plea induced by coercion, promise, and
deceit on the part of the prosecuting attorney is invalid as violative of
due process." In State v. Rose,4 2 the Missouri Supreme Court sanc-
tioned a subjective test of voluntariness and held that a guilty plea may
well be involuntary even where defense counsel was responsible for the
defendant's mistaken belief that a sentence concession had been
granted. These decisions lack any mention of the Whiskey Cases; such
a retreat supports the observation in United States v. Paiva that the
Whiskey Cases are not considered to be sound judicial authority.
3
Apparent from the history of plea bargaining is the need for a rule
of enforcement of plea bargaining agreements which is not dependent
11307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962).
3Id. at 449; see United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
where the court held that a breach of a material promise results in an "unfairly obtained" plea,
violating the fourteenth amendment.
1149 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971).
"Such grounds were the basis for the holdings in the following cases: State v. Davis, 188 So.
2d 24 (Fla. App. 1966); State v. Hingle, 242 La. 844, 139 So. 2d 205 (1962); State v. Ward, 112
W. Va. 552, 165 S.E. 803 (1932).
4049 Wis. 2d at 736, 183 N.W.2d at 61 (emphasis added).
"E.g., Maloney v. Coiner, 152 W. Va. 437, 164 S.E.2d 205 (1968).
2440 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1969). The court in Rose relied heavily on the reasoning found in
United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
"See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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on the type of prosecutorial promise made. Santobello marks the first
time the Supreme Court has spoken in favor of enforcement of plea
bargaining agreements and is the first case to bind a third person to the
agreement. One result of the decision will be that "material" promises
of sentence recommendations will be uniformly honored in both federal
and state courts. Also, the prosecutor who makes the promise will bind
all within his prosecutorial office. While the Court did not deal with the
question whether another prosecutorial office would be bound to the
promise, the result logically follows. However, the extent that non-
participating prosecutors may be bound is still not known, although a
permissive if not mandatory extension of Santobello may sanction cases
like United States v. Carter," which bound two federal districts by a
single prosecutorial promise.45
Does Santobello dictate that all "material" promises be honored,
including promises of immunity from prosecution? The answer depends
upon the basis for the Court's decision. Close scrutiny of the history of
guilty pleas and of the evasive language used by the Court reveals that
the Court must have considered its determination to be constitutionally
required. There is no doubt that Chief Justice Burger's decision was
motivated by the importance of plea bargaining in the administration
of criminal justice and by the Court's notions of justice and fair play.
If prosecutorial promises were not enforced, the number of guilty pleas
would surely decline and the judiciary would soon feel the impact. Also,
reneging on prosecutorial promises outrages common American notions
of courtroom justice. However, interpreting Santobello exclusively in
terms of justice and convenience of administration attributes to the
Court a non-constitutonal and perhaps unconstitutional interference
with state criminal proceedings."
Significant in the Santobello opinion is the absence of any descrip-
tion of Santobello's plea as "involuntary." In this respect the decision
"454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972).
"'The court in Carter bound the District Attorney's office in the District of Columbia Circuit.
The opinion was written but not printed before the decision in Santobello. Subsequently, the Carter
court filed an Addendum stating that Santobello was "additional support for the result we reach."
Id. at 428-29. Query if Santobello would support the enforcement of a plea bargaining promise as
between two sovereigns. Cf. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). But cf. Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
4While Chief Justice Burger failed to use the term "constitutional" in his opinion, it is unlikely
that he intended to overrule a line of decisions beginning with Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.




does not line up with prior plea bargaining and voluntariness decisions.
Does the question of whether the plea was entered voluntarily have any
bearing on the enforcement of plea bargaining agreements? In a sense,
any guilty plea induced by a prosecutorial promise renders such a plea
involuntary. As in the theory of entrapment,47 the crucial question is
whether the defendant would have pleaded guilty without the participa-
tion of the prosecutor. If not, then the plea is involuntary. Such a guilty
plea becomes voluntary, if at all, when the promise is fulfilled. However,
the voluntariness issue can be examined from a different perspective.
Arguably, after a guilty plea is entered, subsequent events have no
bearing on voluntariness-plea bargaining agreements are totally di-
vorced from the voluntariness issue. Whichever perspective is correct,
the opinion in Santobello did focus on the promise as an inducement to
the guilty plea, but other factors were also important to the decision,
indicating that both the "voluntariness" issue and other factors are
necessary in determining the enforceability of plea bargains. Hence, it
would be more correct to say that because of all the factors involved in
such a guilty plea-the convenience to the administration of criminal
justice, justice and fair play, the waiver of constitutional rights-due
process requires either that the promise which induced the guilty plea
be fulfilled or that withdrawal of the plea be permitted.
While Santobello could have been more explicitly reasoned and
more specific upon the question of its applicability to all plea bargaining
promises, the opinion supports the theory that due process requires
fulfillment of plea bargaining promises whenever "material" promises
are involved. Furthermore, the language is broad enough to include all
plea bargaining promises, for nowhere did the majority opinion limit
enforcement to promises of sentence concessions. As a result, more
uniformity of proscutorial conduct will result from Santobello, and ac-
cused persons will be able to more confidently rely upon prosecutorial
promises.
Perhaps the Santobello decision will bring about a uniform state
and federal requirement of disclosure and recordation of every accepted
plea bargain. Such a courtroom procedure has been widely advocated.48
4R. Perkins, CRIMINAL LAW 1033 (2d ed. 1969).
"5ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
PLEAS OF GUILTY §§ 1.5, .7 (1967); D. NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 218 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATON OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 136 (1967); S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 69 (1963); Gentile, Fair
Bargains And Accurate Pleas, 49 B.U.L. REV. 514, 518 (1969); Thompson, The Judge's Responsi-
bility on a Plea of Guilty, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 221 (1960).
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Only in the past few years has any case law appeared which specifically
addressed the problem. In People v. West49 the California Supreme
Court held that court room disclosure and recordation of plea bargain-
ing agreements would be required in California. To avoid the needless
waste of courtroom time and expense which would occur every time a
defendant alleged a breach of a plea bargaining agreement, courts will
necessarily have to begin disclosing and recording these agreements.
Otherwise, false allegations of plea bargains will surely occur. Disclo-
sure and recordation of plea bargains would also provide further pro-
tection for defendants by eliminating the almost impossible task of
proving a plea bargain.
RICHARD L. VANORE
Criminal Procedure-Fourth Amendment Protection and Handwriting
Exemplars-Is Probable Cause Unreasonable?
After the Supreme Court decision in Gilbert v. California,' which
specifically rejected any constitutional objection to the compulsion of
handwriting exemplars grounded on either the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination or the sixth amendment right to counsel,
defendants have redoubled their efforts to bring handwriting exemplars
within the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable search
and seizure.2 They have argued that courts should deny any governmen-
tal request for handwriting exemplars that, if granted, would violate the
defendant's fourth amendment rights and that the exclusionary rule
should be available to enforce that requirement.'
493 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970); see United States v. Williams, 407
F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1969); State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner, - W. Va. -, 179 S.E.2d 726 (1971).
1388 U.S. 263 (1967).
'The fourth amendment provides that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. This protection is guaranteed by the judicially imposed exclusionary rule. In Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court barred, in a federal prosecution, the use
of evidence secured through an illegal search or seizure. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
extended this protection to criminal trials in state courts.
'See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1972), where the court applied
the exclusionary rule to suppress handwriting exemplars taken from one defendant, finding that
the defendant was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure.
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